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The American Psychiatric Association (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-5) (APA, 2013) currently understands what it calls “post-traumatic stress 
disorder” (PTSD), a diagnosis which first appeared in DSM-III (APA, 1980), to involve: 
 
exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence … [the] presence 
of one or more … intrusion symptoms … persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with 
the traumatic event(s) … negative alternations in cognitions and mood associated with the 
traumatic event(s) … marked alterations in arousal and reactivity associated with the 
traumatic event(s) … [for] more than one month … [causing] clinically significant distress 
or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning. (pp. 271-
272) 
 
The concept of post-traumatic growth (PTG), which first emerged in the mid-1990s, 
encompasses many manifestations of post-traumatic “positive change” (Joseph, 2015, p. 
180). 
This paper offers a person-centred political critique of some directions identified in 
the current PTSD and PTG research discourses, research discourses which will increasingly 
effect practitioner and public understandings of PTSD and PTG and which are, therefore, 
highly political. 
Person-centred approaches (PCAs) seem not to always have an entirely clear position 
in relation to politics. Carl Rogers (for instance, Rogers, 1978) wrote politically, and yet, as 
Proctor (2006) says, PCAs have been accused of being “individualistic” (p. 1). I speak as an 
academic/activist sociologist and person-centred psychotherapist-in-training, recognising 
both unique individuals and their location in the social structures of society, such as power 
dynamics present in the field of psychopathology. 
In this paper, I argue that such power dynamics are evident in individualising and 
pathologising emerging notions of PTSD being linked to lower resilience (Regel & Joseph, 
2010), faulty brains (Bell, 2007), lower intelligence (Bomyea, Risbrough & Lang, 2012), and 
faulty femininity (Lilly, Pole, Best, Metzler & Marmar, 2009); and that the more person-
centred language of PTG is being enabled to develop in similar ways (Joseph, Murphy & Regel, 
2012; Joseph, 2015).  
Drawing upon neuroscientific contributions which suggest the presence of faulty 
brains, I contend that what is happening now to PTSD has parallels with how what is currently 
understood as “Borderline Personality Disorder” (BPD) has developed (see Shaw & Proctor, 
2005), and that this is not being noticed by psychotherapists and wider society. BPD is 
attracting more public criticism (e.g. Watts, 2016), and, if we are not careful, this particular 
wheel will need inventing again soon for PTSD. 
My feeling is that PCAs need more confidence if they are to intervene in the current 
PTSD conversation. PCAs do have a place there, as evidenced by practice in this field (e.g. 
Murphy, Archard, Regel & Joseph, 2013; Murphy & Joseph, 2014; Joseph, 2015); as Proctor 
(2002) put it: PCAs can have the “power of individuals within a group of equals, to suggest 
and be listened to” (p. 37).  
PCAs could insist that incongruence is actually “universal” (Biermann-Ratjen, 1998, p. 
114), that no-one at all is fully-functioning, and that what is currently called PTSD is really one 
incongruence amongst many, rather than a psychopathology encountered by some 
(deficient) people who need experts to treat them and make them whole again.  
Such argumentation would draw clearly upon Rogers’ (1978) contentions that people 
do not need to be “guided, instructed, rewarded, punished and controlled” because they have 
the tendency to actualise, “to move towards growth” (p. 8), but, given that PCAs have 
increasingly sought to enter the psychopathology field on its terms rather than person-
centred terms, more important to progress in this field is that PCAs themselves become more 
person-centred, perhaps by revisiting the relevance of existentialism in our work, and by 
recognising that what some call pathology is merely “an essential reminder of our vibrant and 
dangerous aliveness” (Deurzen, 2010, p. 238).   
The paper starts by introducing psychopathology and its relationship with PCAs. A 
critical analysis of PTSD is then offered. In the UK, the National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NIHCE), an organisation which gives “national guidance and advice to improve 
health and social care” (NICHE, 2005, p. 4), currently recommends trauma-focused cognitive 
behavioural therapy (T-FCBT) and eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing (EMDR) as 
psychotherapeutic treatments for PTSD; consequently, they are then explored in comparison 
with PCAs, which are not mentioned by NICE (2005). Murphy et al. (2013) reveal that PCAs 
are now increasingly available in specialist trauma services in the UK; and Murphy and Joseph 
(2014) show the efficacy of PCAs with PTSD, declaring the approach a “radical ontology for 
trauma” (p. 12). This more practice-based material is explored to show that there is an 
increasingly strong place from which PCAs can intervene into the PTSD conversation in the 
ways proposed in this paper. 
 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND PTSD: CRITIQUES AND CONNECTIONS 
Lemma (1996) stated that “psychopathology generally refers to patterns of maladaptive 
behaviour and states of distress which interfere with some aspect of adaptation” (p. 1), and 
Joseph and Worsley (2005) wrote that “psychopathology refers to the study of unusual, 
distressing and dysfunctional psychological conditions” (p. 1).  
Notions of a condition being considered unusual clash with Murphy et al.’s (2013, p. 
435) observation that PTSD diagnoses are “increasingly common”, and references to 
maladaptive behaviour obscure how people are much more than one of their perceived 
behaviours.    
Furthermore, “diagnostic heterogeneity” (Kroes, Whalley, Rugg & Brewin, 2011, p. 
526) needs to be recognised. Curwen and Ruddell (2008) explain that a process of “ruling out” 
happens, and “when all other diagnoses in the differential diagnosis have been ruled out the 
correct diagnosis is presumed to remain” (p. 16). As Lemma (1996) said, there is “mystery” 
(p. 1) here.  
Not all diagnosis is led by psychiatry, though; PTSD first appeared in 1980 with 
reference to war veterans (Humphreys & Joseph, 2004). Veterans wanted this diagnosis, so 
that they would be entitled to access treatment (Burstow, 2005, p. 430). Following feminist 
lobbying in the 1980s and early 1990s (Humphreys & Joseph, 2004, p. 561), in DSM-IV (APA, 
1994), PTSD encompassed abuse survivors (Burstow, 2005, p. 432), whose pain also needed 
to be acknowledged in a public way.  
As such, diagnosis can be meaningful. A client of Rutherford (2007) saw the term PTSD 
as “an anchor amidst her experience of disintegration” (p. 160). Harper and Speed (2014), 
however, point to diagnosis leading to a “devalued [identity]” (p. 40).  
PCAs have been viewed as having “little or no relevance” (Joseph & Worsley, 2005, p. 
1) to psychopathology. Joseph and Worsley (2005) feel that PCAs have been “isolated” from 
psychiatry, causing marginalisation (p. 1). They feel that “we have a duty to understand our 
psychological and psychiatric colleagues” (Joseph & Worsley, 2005, p. 2). This is indeed very 
important, and, indeed, reading Freeth (2007) (a psychiatrist and psychotherapist) may 
prompt empathy with psychiatrists; Freeth (2007) says that psychiatrists “are expected to 
take responsibility” and “condemned for being controlling” (p. 102).  
Perhaps most compelling from the psychiatry literature, in my view, is what is termed 
“post-psychiatry”. Tseris (2013) explains this as aiming “to grapple with issues of context and 
meaning, challenging the primacy of biological explanations and yet not denying that mental 
distress is an embodied experience” (p. 161). This suggests some common ground with PCAs, 
for as Sanders and Tudor (2001) say, PCAs can make a “specific contribution to the 
[psychopathology] debate in viewing personality as a process rather than as a structure” (p. 
153). Tudor and Worrall (2006), for instance, offer a vignette in which a woman client who 
“describes alienation from her species [humans]” comes alive when birds fly past the window, 
enabling her therapist to “refocus on her vitality and authenticity” (p.159).  
Joseph (2005) carefully explores how person-centred personality processes, 
behaviour and defence can be applied to PTSD. Joseph (2005) feels that: “PTSD symptoms are 
... another way of talking about ... the breakdown and disorganisation of the self-structure” 
(p. 192). People experience a “denial to awareness of existential experiences” (p. 192), and 
“trauma shows us the limits of the human condition” (p. 194). PTSD intrusion/avoidance 
symptoms can be understood as the person “[attempting] on the one hand, to accurately 
symbolise in awareness their experience (intrusion) and on the other, to deny their 
experiences and hold onto their pre-existing self-structure (avoidance)” (Joseph, 2005, p. 
194). While Joseph (2005) accounts for the diagnosis of PTSD in a way that can be followed 
by PCAs, that should not mean that PTSD itself should be accepted uncritically by PCAs; we 
need to look more deeply at the implications of embracing PTSD as it is currently constructed.  
In the newest DSM, DSM-5 (APA, 2013), “Anxiety Disorders have been redistributed 
into three ... classifications [including] Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorders” (Reichenberg, 
2014, p. 35). This renders PTSD more descriptive. Even in previous DSMs, PTSD was “one of 
only a few diagnoses ... whose symptoms [were] attributed to situational causes alone” 
(Hodges, 2003, p. 409). This way of seeing has obscured a more important point made by 
Hodges (2003) that: “PTSD ... cannot be conceptualised as a ‘normal’ response to trauma and 
simultaneously be called a ‘disorder’” (p. 411). Indeed, Burstow (2005) explores whether PTSD 
responses are ‘disordered’ at all. She says “it is unclear what makes … responses symptoms 
of a disease, it is not even clear that these are unfortunate or unwise responses. It depends 
on the context” (p. 434). Furthermore, DSM-5 (APA, 2013) introduces three new symptoms 
to PTSD diagnosis, including: “persistent and distorted cognitions that lead the person to 
blame self or others” (Reichenberg, 2014, p. 48). This seems ripe for an implication that 
anything that happens to an individual is their own responsibility.  
Regel and Joseph (2010) say “there are no ‘right’ and ‘wrong’” (p. 3) trauma reactions. 
This feels untrue as they also say “some people may be less resilient” (p. 1). Furthermore, as 
research starts to identify types of intrusive thoughts, a position is now being reached where 
there are right and wrong intrusive thoughts: “brooding is thought to impede cognitive 
processing ... reflection is thought to facilitate cognitive processing” (Stockton, Hunt & 
Joseph, 2011, p. 85). While it is very important to explore the nuances of PTSD, in order to 
fully understand its dynamics, there is some pathologising here; for people cannot easily 
choose which intrusive thoughts to entertain, and it is likely to be distressing/stigmatising to 
learn that one’s intrusive thoughts are of the wrong sort.  
PTSD has a gendered nature: “men tend to experience more traumatic events than 
women, but women often tend to experience higher impact of events” (Regel & Joseph, 2010, 
p. 22). Hodges (2003) notes that PTSD is “deemed pathological because it persists” (p. 414): 
women’s emotional distress has a history of being viewed as tiresome (Chesler, 2005). Lilly et 
al. (2009), in a study of 157 female police officers and 124 female civilians, note how 
“peritraumatic dissociation is one of the strongest correlates of PTSD” (p. 767), but that 
women police, for whom “the cost of openly expressing fear and helplessness may be great” 
(p. 772), experience less peritraumatic dissociation and less PTSD than female civilians. Lilly 
et al. (2009) want to “design interventions” to change civilian women (p. 772). This way of 
thinking provides a contemporary example of some women being perceived as faulty and in 
need of fixing by experts with interventions; of it being some women’s own fault that they 
responded to trauma in particular ways; if only they were more like men…      
Although Regel and Joseph (2010) identify many “pre-trauma risk factors” (p. 25), 
intelligence is appearing in the PTSD discourse. Bomyea et al. (2012) link “lower intelligence 
prior to trauma exposure [to] PTSD development” (p. 634); “one hypothesis is that those with 
higher intelligence are better able to use effective problem solving strategies to cope with 
symptoms” (p. 634). More research is said to be needed (Bomyea et al., 2012), but this 
argument has potential to pathologise groups with a higher prevalence of PTSD – women and 
particular ethnic minority groups (e.g. Perez Benitez, Zlotnick, Gomez, Rendon & Swanson 
(2013) study Latinos) and it in fact already stigmatises anyone experiencing PTSD as 
potentially lacking intelligence.  
Similarly, Kroes et al. (2011) say that studies have explored “brain variation” and have 
found “abnormalities” which are “similar to those implicated in major depressive disorder, 
raising the question of whether they ... reflect common difficulties, for example in emotion 
regulation” (p. 525); Bell (2007) makes it clearer: “it is still unknown whether smaller 
hippocampal volume predispose persons to PTSD or whether it is an effect of the disorder” 
(p. 29).  
Such material on brains has parallels with some research exploring BPD – also a 
psychopathology disproportionately applied to women (see Shaw and Proctor, 2005); women 
diagnosed with BPD are pathologised as being faulty, for instance being declared 
manipulative of others (Watts, 2016). Berdahl (2010) explains that “functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) [have been used] to gain 
some insight into how the BPD brain works” (p. 177) and that “studies do converge on the 
general impression that the BPD brain has some sort of dysfunction in limbic and prefrontal 
areas” (p. 177).  
This research introduces a notion of the “BPD brain”; and the research mentioned 
above starts to suggest the “PTSD brain”. This is highly problematic, for it has potential to 
locate the trigger for a perceived psychopathology in the being of the person affected rather 
than in the trauma that the person has experienced, rendering PTSD no more neutral than 
BPD. Machizawa-Summers (2007), for instance, already questions the reality of people 
diagnosed with BPD, saying “it is important to assess whether the BPD patients’ perceptions 
of parental behaviours and traumatic experience are coloured by their pre-existing 
psychological problems or whether these negative childhood experiences facilitate 
development of borderline pathology” (p. 271). This parallel alone should prompt caution in 
embracing the PTSD discourse.   
Joseph (2005) says that person-centred theory enables understanding of PTG: “as the 
client comes more to develop a self-structure that is congruent between self and experience, 
they should also become more fully functioning and able to engage in organismic valuing” (p. 
197). However, drawing upon Harper and Speed (2014), it is clear that such progress is built 
upon “deficit” (p. 41). Indeed, current research into PTG does highlight personal deficiency: 
Joseph et al. (2012) report that “greater PTG is associated with ... emotional stability; 
extraversion; openness to experience; optimism; and self-esteem” (p. 320). Likewise, there is 
an “optimum” level of PTSD needed for PTG: “moderate” (Joseph et al., 2012, p. 320), for then 
“the individual’s assumptive world has in some way been challenged, triggering the intrusive 
and avoidant experiences, but the person remains able to cope ... and engage sufficiently in 
the necessary cognitive processing needed to work through” (Joseph et al., 2012, p. 320). 
Thus, even a concept that feels positive contains traps for the unwary – notions that people 
did not experience sufficient PTG because they lacked particular, currently-prized, personal 
qualities to begin with. 
Overall, PTSD originally appeared to be a helpful diagnostic classification (Burstow, 
2005), but the current direction of the PTSD discourse, and the PTG discourse which has 
followed it, starts to have problematic elements, particularly when a strong parallel with BPD 
is recognised.  
PCAs are well-placed to offer a critique of the current discourses because PCAs 
recognise and could much more clearly insist that incongruence is actually “universal” 
(Biermann-Ratjen, 1998, p. 114), rather than a psychopathology encountered by some 
(deficient) people who need fixing by experts. But PCAs can only intervene into the debate if 
they have a place there. The next section explores treatments for PTSD and how PCAs are 
positioned amongst them. 
 
TRAUMA-FOCUSED COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL THERAPY, EYE MOVEMENT 
DESENSITISATION AND REPROCESSING, AND PERSON-CENTRED APPROACHES 
 
As indicated above, the UK’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) (2005) 
proposes trauma-focused cognitive behavioural therapy (T-FCBT) or eye movement 
desensitisation and reprocessing (EMDR) for PTSD (and medication but says it “should not be 
used as a routine first-line treatment for adults” (p. 4)).  
T-FCBT implicitly holds a position of personal deficit. Techniques include “exposure”: 
“prolonged imaginal exposure requires the individual with PTSD to vividly imagine the trauma 
for prolonged periods” (Harvey, Bryant, & Tarrier, 2003, p. 502); “cognitive restructuring”, 
which “involves teaching patients to identify and evaluate the evidence of negative automatic 
thoughts” (Harvey et al., 2003., p. 503); and “anxiety management training” (Harvey et al., 
2003, p. 503). Burstow (2005), above, made clear that the “context” matters in deciding if 
“fear” is “unwise” (p. 434). Tseris (2013) feels “standard CBT strategies” can “offer only 
superficial and inadequate support” (p. 160) for interpersonal trauma; “re-traumatisation” is 
also possible via “exposure” (Seidler & Wagner, 2006, p. 1512).   
Regel and Joseph (2010) explain that T-FCBT is about: “helping the sufferer challenge 
and change problematic thoughts and meanings” (p. 52). Harvey, Bryant and Tarrier (2003) 
explain this begins with “psycho-education”, which aims “to legitimise the trauma reaction, 
to help the patient develop a formulation of their symptoms, and to establish a rationale for 
treatment” (p. 502). The idea of “legitimising” (Harvey et al., 2003, p. 502) feels respectful, 
but Guilfoyle (2008) also notes how CBT “patronises” (p. 198). He also says that “CBT’s 
complicity with contemporary power arrangements is ... blatant” – the intention is for people 
to return to work quickly (p. 197). (See also Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2015).  
EMDR may be an alternative, although not for everyone – Tarquinio et al. (2012) 
report excluding participants with “health issues, neurological disorders, eye disorders/pain, 
dissociative disorders, etc.” (p. 207), and Coffeng (2004), a Focusing-Oriented therapist, notes 
that a client’s PTSD “had become worse after a treatment with EMDR” (p. 284).  
While T-FCBT requires an instrumental therapeutic alliance (Polak et al., 2012, p. 4), 
EMDR “[lets] the process of therapeutic change organically unfold” (p. 402). However, 
protocol is what is figural in understandings of EMDR for PTSD (Marich, 2012, p. 405), again 
positioning clients as objects upon whom to practice interventions.   
Pilgrim (2009) observes that current guidance about treatments for PTSD “is informed 
by evidence, but not all evidence is being used” (p. 336). The “common factors” approach, as 
outlined by Hubble et al. (2010, p. 35-39), draws attention to “client and extratherapeutic 
factors”, “the therapeutic relationship/alliance” and “therapist factors”; Hubble, Duncan, 
Miller and Wampold (2010) observe that “it is no longer a matter of which therapeutic 
approach is best. Rather, it is about showing that a treatment, conducted by a given therapist 
with a particular client at a specific time and place, yielded positive results” (p. 39).  
Benish, Imel and Wampold (2008) conducted a meta-analysis of a range of 
psychotherapies and demonstrated that “bona fide psychotherapies produce equivalent 
benefits for patients with PTSD” (p. 746), but the meta-analysis did not include PCAs. As 
Joseph (2015) observes: “practitioners of the PCA are marginalised in clinical practice because 
of the perception that they lack the knowledge or skills to work with traumatised individuals” 
(p. 180). PCAs need to be more visible, and increasingly they are becoming so.  
Murphy and Joseph’s (2014) experience is that PCAs step in when T-FCBT/ EMDR have 
failed: people go “‘through the system’ several times” with a focus upon “symptoms” (as 
described above) and are “missed ... as a person” (p. 5). Tseris (2013) argues that 
interpersonal trauma needs more than “standard CBT” (p. 160). Murphy and Joseph (2014) 
suggest that “clients who have experienced neglect, abuse or domestic violence especially 
benefit from the genuine warmth and prizing of the social environment created in person-
centred therapy” (p. 90). This is respectful rather than explicitly about personal deficit. PCAs 
are not entirely distinct, however: exposure therapies also require “accurate symbolisation” 
and “what PCT adds is ... that there is no need ... to push the client because the client will be 
intrinsically motivated to increase congruence between self and experience” (Joseph, 2005, 
p. 196). PCAs allow for individual differences more respectfully than behavioural approaches 
(Joseph, 2005).  
Nonetheless, the PTSD discourse can sometimes lead PCAs away from “the 
uniqueness of the experience” (Schmid, 1998, p. 75), and into the realms of potential “power 
over” (“domination, coercive authority” (Proctor, 2002, p. 37)), almost bringing PCAs 
alongside some ways of conceptualising CBT/EMDR; but there is also sensitivity/creativity in 
current PCAs for PTSD, allowing for an arising of “power-from-within … an inner strength” 
(Proctor, 2002, p. 37).  
Murphy and Joseph (2014) adopt a “principled non-directive approach” (p. 3) which is 
very respectful – but in one instance I felt that their focus on not responding to the question 
of a client diagnosed with PTSD (when she seeks reassurance) (Murphy & Joseph, 2014, p. 8-
9) drew to mind Totton’s (2012) point that “there are many subtle ways in which the therapist 
can imply that they know better than the client” (p. 29). I contrast this with Hawkins (2014) – 
although her client is experiencing flashbacks, Hawkins (2014) does not deploy the term PTSD 
(p. 20): she fully connects, person to person. Is there something about the absence of the 
language of PTSD that enabled this, I wonder? 
What I feel matters most in the person-centred field now is not how incongruence 
may be mapped to PTSD to explain, in person-centred terms, a psychopathology encountered 
by some people (but not others) for individual reasons – which can then be approached in 
person-centred ways. Instead, we should properly recognise that the fully-functioning person 
who is “never really endangered by new experience [and has] no need to defend against any 
form of self experience” (Biermann-Ratjen, 1998, p. 114) does not exist and never will. As 
such, we can fully embrace the idea that everyone has a psychopathology of some sort or 
another, and one (PTSD included) is not better or worse than another. We can then enter the 
psychopathology debate on humane, equalising terms, rather than on psychopathology’s 
own often-objectifying terms of disorder and deficit. PCAs already do recognise that people 
can be “trusted” (Rogers, 1978, p. 8), that they can flourish in a “growth-promoting climate” 
(Rogers, 1978, p. 9) which offers empathy, unconditional positive regard and congruence. We 
need to say that more confidently, and share more evidence of PCAs’ effectiveness, as 
precursors to challenging psychopathology’s language. This may be difficult for some PCA 
researchers and practitioners who engage with psychopathologies as currently understood, 
but it is consistent with the theory, philosophy and practice of our encounters with people. 
Indeed, as we gain confidence in this field, we may start to draw more explicitly upon the 
existential aspects of the philosophy underpinning our practice, and look more widely into 
existentialism. Personally, I very much appreciate the British School of Existential Analysis 
founder, Deurzen (2010), when she states that what some call “pathology” is merely “an 
essential reminder of our vibrant and dangerous aliveness” (p. 238). My feeling is that this is 
a conceptualisation that might be accepted more by PCAs.      
“New form[s] of communication” (Totton, 2012, p. 107) are important in the work 
envisaged in this paper, and Warner’s (2005, 2014) research is invaluable, unless her ideas of 
difficult process become co-opted into diagnosis (Tudor & Merry (2002, p. 8) link “difficult 
process” and “personality disorders”). Difficult process is, for Warner (2014), “descriptions of 
some common client experiences rather than diagnostic categories” (p. 122). Some PTSD 
experiences feel consistent with difficult process. There is a long-term project here, for as 
Warner (2005) says, “if, as PC theorists, we are able to clarify ... an overall model of health 
and pathology, we may also be able to increase our effectiveness in critiquing and offering 
constructive alternatives to current systems of mental health services” (p. 91).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As Humphreys and Joseph (2004) note, “some aspects of the PTSD discourse are developed 
and others disregarded” (p. 564). In this paper, instances have been shown where there is as 
yet insufficient recognition of the individualising/pathologising nature of some current PTSD 
and PTG discourses – emerging notions of lower resilience (Regel & Joseph, 2010), faulty 
brains (Bell, 2007), lower intelligence (Bomyea et al., 2012), faulty femininity (Lilly et al., 2009) 
and personal deficits (Joseph et al., 2012). Some troubling parallels with the development of 
the BPD discourse have been shown.   
I have argued that PCAs need to be more politically aware and engaged, more willing 
to influence the direction of the PTSD conversation than to seek permission to listen to it. 
PCAs are increasingly showing their relevance to PTSD and can increasingly claim a place 
alongside more established psychotherapies for PTSD, acquiring the “power of individuals 
within a group of equals, to suggest and be listened to” (Proctor, 2002, p. 37). I have suggested 
how this power may be used to good effect, by challenging discourses which feel problematic.  
Williamson (2010) argues that intimate partner violence (IPV) can lead to “responses” 
which “mimic” PTSD; she says that “we know far too little to assume that ... [IPV] ... inevitably 
results in a diagnosable psychiatric condition, as opposed to creating confusion” (p. 1416). It 
may eventually be that PCAs will reject the term PTSD altogether, and call for others to do 
likewise. Certainly, arguments against the label BPD are currently gathering pace in a public 
psychotherapy (see Watts, 2016, for instance).  
In the meantime, as PTSD can be helpful to people making meaning of symptoms, it 
does feel appropriate to seek to work with PTSD. PCAs are a refreshing alternative in this field 
to forms of psychotherapy where experts seek to help stigmatised others. But let us always 
keep a critical eye upon research findings and their implications.  
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